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TAKE IT WITH A GRAIN (OR MORE) OF SALT:
WHY INDUSTRY-BACKED DIETARY GUIDELINES FAIL
AMERICANS AND HOW TO FIX THEM
Caroline Farrington*

ABSTRACT
The U.S. Dietary Guidelines lack oversight and accountability. The result:
Guidelines that reflect food industry interests instead of modern science. This deleterious
guidance goes on to govern federally-subsidized food assistance programs and to
influence dietary choices throughout the private sector and private life. Ultimately, the
Guidelines significantly contribute to the endemic chronic disease they seek to address.
The Guidelines Advisory Committee is notoriously rife with conflicts of interest,
and thus most Guidelines scholarship has focused on reforming the Committee. But the
2015 and 2020 Guidelines show that these reforms are insufficient and agency-level
change is necessary. In 2015, the Committee made several controversial
recommendations related to red meat, ultraprocessed foods, sodium, and sustainability.
Due to industry backlash, only the sodium recommendation survived in the final
Guidelines published by the Secretaries of the U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA)
and Health and Human Services (HHS). In 2020, the Secretaries, for the first time,
predetermined a list of eighty topics that the Committee may consider. Absent from this
list are the most contentious topics from previous years. There is little recourse because
the Guidelines are not considered an agency action subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), despite their vast impact on food assistance programs, healthcare
practices, tort law, and more.
This Note proposes two ways to bring the Guidelines within the APA’s coverage.
The first is a litigation strategy, arguing that the D.C. District Court relied on
erroneous reasoning when it held that the Guidelines are not an agency action subject to
the APA. Second, this Note describes some ways that Congress could amend the
Nutrition Act, the statute governing the Guidelines. Applying the APA to the Guidelines
would allow for public participation and public challenge, greater transparency, and
greater efficiency across agencies. Evidence-based Guidelines would improve overall
health, reduce healthcare costs, and ensure that food assistance beneficiaries can access
healthy foods. A robust set of Guidelines would improve public confidence in the
recommendations and enable further food law reforms, such as amending the Farm Bill,
that would make it easier for people to make healthy choices.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Michigan Law School. I want to thank my Notes
Editors, Nicholas John and Meredith Joseph, and the entire Journal of Law Reform team, for their
dedication to improving this Note. I’m grateful to Professors Rebecca Eisenberg, Nina Mendelson,
Beth Wilensky, and Dan Deacon, as well as Professor Maureen Carroll and members of the Student
Research Roundtable, for their generous support and encouragement. And huge thanks to my
parents for, well, everything.
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INTRODUCTION
Poor diet is the number one cause of poor health and premature
death in America, claiming approximately 700,000 lives annually. 1 The
standard American 2 diet (ironically termed “SAD”) is “too high in
calories, saturated fat, sodium, and added sugars, and [too low in]
fruits, vegetables, whole grains, calcium, and fiber.” 3 These dietary
deficiencies contribute to some of the leading causes of death and other
diseases that can make Americans’ everyday lives more difficult. 4
Nearly half of all American adults deal with one or more preventable,
chronic diseases. 5
1. See Christopher J.L. Murray, U.S. Burden of Disease Collaborators, The State of U.S.
Health, 1990-2010: Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors, 310 JAMA NETWORK 591, 596, 600 fig.3
(2013).
2. For consistency with other nutrition literature, this Note uses “American” to mean
relating to the United States or its inhabitants, but acknowledges that the term can denote all of
the Americas.
3. Why Good Nutrition Is Important, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INT., https://www.cspinet.org
/eating-healthy/why-good-nutrition-important [https://perma.cc/RVT6-T3ZB].
4. Id.
5. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR
AMERICANS 2015–2020 xi (8th ed. 2015) [hereinafter DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020].
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To address this public health crisis, U.S. nutrition policy focuses on
education, labeling, and other forms of information regulation. 6 At the
heart of these efforts lie the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (the
Guidelines). This report, published every five years by the U.S.
Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and of Health and Human Services
(HHS), contains nutritional information for the general public. 7 The
Guidelines have been called “the single most powerful influence on
American food choices.” 8 They influence FDA labeling regulations and
form the basis of federally subsidized food programs, which serve
eighty million beneficiaries each year. 9 They impact food producers
who want to participate in those programs. 10 They influence how
physicians advise patients. 11 Most importantly, they have a material
effect on the health of Americans. For instance, when the 2000
Guidelines targeted trans fatty acids, FDA soon required manufacturers
to disclose a product’s trans fat content on its nutrition facts label.12
This inclusion prompted many manufacturers and restaurants to
eliminate trans fats from their products. 13 A Harvard School of Public
Health study identifies “lower trans fat consumption as one of the
major reasons rates of premature death and disease fell among
American adults from 1999 to 2012.” 14
While the Guidelines have helped achieve improvements in public
health, they are deeply flawed, both in substance and methodology. The
food and beverage industries have tremendous influence over the
Guidelines, leading to recommendations that are often ambiguous,
scientifically unsound, and downright harmful. The public has little
recourse for challenging this dangerous advice because the Guidelines

6. Emily M. Broad Leib & Margot J. Pollans, The New Food Safety, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1173, 1187
(2019).
7. DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at vii.
8. Laura Reiley, How the Trump Administration Limited the Scope of the USDA’s 2020 Dietary
Guidelines, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/30/howtrump-administration-limited-scope-usdas-dietary-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/PM5P-DFFE].
9. Brian Secemsky, Breaking It Down: Controversy over the U.S. Dietary Guidelines, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 24, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/breaking-it-down-controve_b_10622814
[https://perma.cc/2BH7-2YTS]; see also DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at xi, 5–6.
10. Reiley, supra note 8.
11. Sandra G. Hassink & Steven J. Stack, Physician Perspective: Keep Politics out of Dietary
Guidelines, HILL (Oct. 7, 2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/256067-physicianperspective-keep-politics-out-of-dietary-guidelines [https://perma.cc/QZA9-3L3A].
12. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrition Content Claims, and
Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41434, 41436–37 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
13. Markham Heid, Experts Say Lobbying Skewed the U.S. Dietary Guidelines, TIME (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://time.com/4130043/lobbying-politics-dietary-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/2C39-WUVJ].
14. Id.; Improvements in U.S. Diet Lower Premature Deaths, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/improvements-in-usdiet-lower-premature-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/539G-8WKF].
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are insulated from any meaningful forms of public participation, such
that the agencies responsible have never been held accountable.
This Note proposes to reform the process by which the Guidelines
are developed to improve their substance and thus their impact on
American health. First, this Note discusses the history of the Guidelines
and outlines the legal framework surrounding them. Next, it explores
key shortcomings of the Guidelines. Finally, this Note argues that an
effective way to address these shortcomings is to bring the Guidelines
within the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
puts forth two strategies—one legislative and one judicial—for
accomplishing this.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans
Given the Guidelines’ contentious history, their current problems
come as no surprise. From the very beginning, the Guidelines have been
the epicenter of a hard-fought battle between scientists, politicians,
and bureaucrats.
The federal government has been shaping American diets for more
than 100 years. USDA’s first nutritional guidelines were published as a
farmers’ bulletin in 1894 by Dr. Wilbur Olin Atwater, 15 who served as a
highly-ranked USDA official and is considered the father of modern
nutrition research and education. 16 Published sixteen years before the
discovery of individual vitamins, these guidelines focused on the overall
balance of macronutrients in the diet by encouraging greater
consumption of protein and lower consumption of starches and
sugars. 17 In 1916, USDA’s first food guide 18 introduced the concept of
food groups that remains the foundation of nutrition policy today,
15.

W.O. ATWATER, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARMERS’ BULLETIN NO. 23, FOODS: NUTRITIVE VALUE
(1894), https://ia902506.us.archive.org/14/items/CAT87201446/farmbul0023.pdf [https://
perma.cc/49BG-UCZB].
16. Carole Davis & Etta Saltos, Dietary Recommendations and How They Have Changed over Time,
in AMERICA’S EATING HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34 (1999). Abraham Lincoln
established USDA in 1862 “to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful
information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense
of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds
and plants.” An Act to Establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (1862). Atwater
embraced this broad mission and “initiated the scientific basis for connecting food composition,
dietary intake, and health, and emphasized the importance of variety, proportionality, and
moderation in healthful eating.” Davis & Saltos, supra, at 34.
17. Davis & Saltos, supra note 16, at 34.
18. CAROLINE L. HUNT, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARMERS’ BULLETIN NO. 717, FOOD FOR YOUNG
CHILDREN (1916), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc96383/m1/1/ [https://perma.cc/
F3JD-RT2D]; see also Davis & Saltos, supra note 16, at 35.
AND COST
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though the number of groups has varied between four and seven. 19
Updated guidelines were published in 1921, 1933, 1943, 1946, and 1956.20
These voluntary updates generally responded to wartime or financial
circumstances, warranting cost-conscious dietary recommendations. 21
During World War II, the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) established a
committee to advise the federal government on nutrition problems that
might affect national defense, such as by reducing the supply of healthy
soldiers and workers or creating health crises that take resources away
from the war effort. 22 This committee developed the first
Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDAs), which listed specific
recommended intakes for calories and essential nutrients like iron,
calcium, and vitamin C. 23 RDAs have evolved into a broader set of
guidelines which are updated periodically by the National Academies at
the direction of various governmental entities. 24 These guidelines serve
as a basis for the Daily Values found on FDA-mandated “Nutrition
Facts” labeling, which are also heavily influenced by the Guidelines. 25
The modern Guidelines were first released in 1980, in the wake of
legislators’ attempts to take food policy into their own hands. 26 Under
Senator George McGovern, the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition
and Human Needs issued Dietary Goals for the United States in 1977.27
Better known as the McGovern Report, Dietary Goals contained a new
set of nutritional guidelines for Americans aimed at combatting the
“Nation’s major killer diseases.” 28 The Committee recommended eating
more fruits, vegetables, and whole grains, and fewer high-fat meat,

19. Lisa Jahns, Wendy Davis-Shaw, Alice H. Lichtenstein, Suzanne P. Murphy, Zach Conrad
& Forrest Nielsen, The History and Future of Dietary Guidance in America, 9 ADVANCES NUTRITION 136,
136–37 (2018).
20. Davis & Saltos, supra ŸƂƿīܶܶۮڋچĀƿܶڋڈڊڈ۴
21. See id.
22. Alfred E. Harper, Contributions of Women Scientists in the U.S. to the Development of
Recommended Dietary Allowances, 133 J. NUTRITION 3698, 3700 (2003).
23. ELIZABETH FRAZÃO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 750,
AMERICA’S EATING HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 35 (1999).
24. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DIETARY REFERENCE INTAKES: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE
TO NUTRIENT REQUIREMENTS ܅ܶڌڋfīŸŸŔŅīƩܶf۴ܶƿƿīŸܶۮfīŸŸŔŅīƩܶ¦ŔƿǴŔܶOīŭŭǤŔņܶܶދkŔŸĤĀܶ%۴ܶuīǪīƩƱܶۮīĤƱ۴ܶۮ
2006).
25. See infra note 58.
26. History of the Dietary Guidelines, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMS., https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov
/about-dietary-guidelines/history-dietary-guidelines [https://perma.cc/48JV-GLCY] [hereinafter
History].
27. Id.
28. Summary: History of the Dietary Guidance Development in the United States, DIETARY GUIDELINES
FOR AMS., https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/about-dietary-guidelines/history-dietary-guidelines
/summary-dietary-guidance-development [https://perma.cc/JAJ5-FAN5] [hereinafter Summary];
STAFF OF S. SELECT COMM. ON NUTRITION AND HUM. NEEDS, 95TH CONG., DIETARY GOALS FOR THE
UNITED STATES XXI (1977).
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egg, and dairy products. 29 The McGovern Report reflected a shift in
focus from getting enough nutrients to avoiding excessive intake of
food components associated with chronic disease. 30
The McGovern Report received criticism from many directions. 31
The cattle, dairy, egg, and sugar industries, including those from
Senator McGovern’s home state of South Dakota, were displeased with
the recommendations to limit intake of their products. 32 The American
Medical Association expressed its view that dietary guidance should be
individualized and come from one’s doctor (as opposed to guidance for
the general public). 33 The nutrition community largely rejected the
advice proffered by the McGovern Report and felt that “a senate
committee had no business getting involved in recommendations that
ought to be made by the scientific community.” 34 In the face of such
backlash, the Committee held additional hearings and issued a revised
report in late 1977. 35 This second edition tempered the
recommendations regarding salt, cholesterol, and meat consumption.36
Recognizing the need for authoritative guidance, USDA and HHS
(known then as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare)
took on the role of developing dietary recommendations. 37 In 1980, the
departments collaboratively released Nutrition and Your Health: Dietary
Guidelines for Americans. 38 Like the McGovern Report, the 1980
Guidelines encountered controversy, prompting Congress to direct
USDA and HHS to use an external advisory committee for future
editions of the Guidelines. 39 The 1985 Guidelines did not make many
changes to the 1980 Guidelines, but faced much less pushback than
their predecessor. 40 1985 thus marks the beginning of the modern
Guidelines era, in which they enjoy widespread acceptance and
underpin American nutrition policy. 41
In 1990, Congress passed the National Nutrition Monitoring and
Related Research Act (the Nutrition Act), which for the first time
mandated that USDA and HHS publish the Guidelines (the first three

29. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND
HEALTH 40 (2d ed. 2007).
30. Summary, supra note 28.
31. NESTLE, supra note 29, at 40.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 41.
34. Interview by Henry Blackburn with Mark Hegsted 3 (2005), http://www.foodpolitics.com
/wp-content/uploads/Hegsted.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4CL-ESSQ].
35. NESTLE, supra note 29, at 41–42.
36. Id.
37. History, supra note 26.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 45–57.
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editions were voluntary). 42 Under the Nutrition Act, at least every five
years, the USDA and HHS Secretaries must publish a report containing
“nutritional and dietary information and guidelines for the general
public . . . based on the preponderance of the scientific and medical
knowledge which is current at the time the report is prepared.” 43 The
Nutrition Act also requires that any federal nutrition guidance be
reviewed by the USDA and HHS Secretaries before issuance,
illustrating lawmakers’ intent for the Guidelines to become the
cornerstone of American nutrition policy. 44
That intent has become a reality. The Healthy Meals for Healthy
Americans Act of 1994 required federally subsidized meal programs to
provide meals in conformity with the Guidelines. 45 Among the largest of
these meal programs, the National School Lunch Program serves
around thirty million children daily. 46 The School Breakfast Program
serves an additional two billion meals annually, 47 and children consume
up to fifty percent of their calories at school. 48 The Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC) has eight million beneficiaries. 49 Programs funded under the
Older Americans Act serve more than 900,000 meals each day. 50
Military meals, Veterans Affairs health facility meals, and many other
federally subsidized meal programs are based on the Guidelines. 51
These far-reaching effects extend into the private sector as well.
Because federal programs purchase $100 billion of food each year,
manufacturers often formulate (or reformulate) entire product lines
around the Guidelines in order to participate in those prgrams.52

42. History, supra note 26.
43. 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1) –(2).
44. Id. § 5341(a)(1)–(b). Rules or regulations issued by a federal agency are exempt from this
review requirement. Id. § 5341(b)(3).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(f)(1)(A).
46. National School Lunch Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://
www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/child-nutrition-programs/national-schoollunch-program/ [https://perma.cc/3XSZ-85AH].
47. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs, 77
Fed. Reg. 4088, 4109 (Jan. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts 210, 220).
48. Id.; Jessica Donze Black, Healthy School Lunches Can Reduce Childhood Obesity and Diabetes,
PEW (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/04/06/healthyschool-lunches-can-reduce-childhood-obesity-and-diabetes [https://perma.cc/7H92-TV66].
49. DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at 5.
50. Community Meal Programs, AGENCY ON AGING S. CENT. CONN., https://www.aoascc.org
/Services/Community-Services-and-Advocacy/Nutrition-Programs [https://perma.cc/Q6TB-LDYD];
see 42 U.S.C. § 3030g-21.
51. DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at 5; see, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFS., VHA
DIRECTIVE 2010-007, HEALTHY DIET GUIDELINES 2 (2010), https://www.vendorportal.ecms.va.gov/
FBODocumentServer/DocumentServer.aspx?DocumentId=1139745&FileName=VA262-14-R-0089003.pdf [https://perma.cc/H74C-EJKR].
52. Reiley, supra note 8.
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Nursing homes, hospitals, and universities conform to the Guidelines, 53
and the Guidelines influence the food served in restaurants and cooked
at home. 54 Healthcare professionals look to the Guidelines when
advising their patients, 55 and the Guidelines shape Americans’ idea of a
healthy diet. 56 Remarkably, the Guidelines are poised to become even
more influential because they recently added recommendations for
infants and pregnant individuals, as directed by the 2014 Farm Bill. 57
The labeling requirements imposed on nearly every packaged food
product are also heavily influenced by the Guidelines. FDA regulates
food labeling in two major ways. First, FDA requires packaged foods to
include a “Nutrition Facts” label detailing the foods’ nutrient contents,
expressed as % Daily Value (%DV). 58 The Guidelines heavily influence
which nutrients are required and how %DVs are calculated. 59 Second,
FDA regulates food labeling by defining when packaging may contain
various “health claims.”60 These regulations and guidances dictate when
a food may be labeled as “low-sodium” or “healthy,” and they historically
have been consistent with the Guidelines. Furthermore, FDA has
responded to past changes in the Guidelines by reconsidering its
approach to regulating health claims. 61
53. See, e.g., MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, DIET MANUAL FOR LONG-TERM CARE
RESIDENTS 5 (2014).
54. See Heid, supra note 13.
55. Hassink & Stack, supra note 11 (“Physicians routinely provide patients with guidance on
how to stay healthy. We rely on the best available scientific evidence to make these recommendations,
and fortunately, we have had the Dietary Guidelines for Americans to turn to. Unfortunately, that
could all change; there are unprecedented attacks taking place in Congress right now that threaten
the scientific integrity of the guidelines.”).
56. See Rick Paulas, Congress Doesn’t Think Health and Environmental Issues Are Linked, KCET
(Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.kcet.org/food-discovery/food/congress-doesnt-think-health-andenvironmental-issues-are-linked [https://perma.cc/7BFU-P3FB].
57. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 4204, 128 Stat. 822–23.
58. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2015).
59. For example, FDA’s treatment of added sugar has closely followed the Guidelines. In 2014,
FDA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would substantially update the requirements of
the Nutrition Facts label. One of the most significant (and controversial) was the mandatory
declaration of “added sugars” content. Previously, labels did not differentiate between types of
sugar. FDA explained that the proposed change was intended to “provide consumers with
information they need to implement the dietary recommendations of the Dietary Guidelines for
Americans, 2010,” which warned of the dangers of added sugar. Nutrition and Supplement Facts
Labels, 79 Fed. Reg. 11880, 11881 (proposed Mar. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). After
the 2015 Committee report was published and introduced a quantitative limit on added sugar
intake, FDA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, revising its proposed rule to
require labels to include a %DV for added sugar based on the limit set by the Guidelines. Nutrition
and Supplement Facts Labels, 80 Fed. Reg. 44303 (July 27, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
60. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (2015).
61. Prior to 2010, the Guidelines recommended limiting consumption of fat overall, whereas
the 2010 Guidelines focused on limiting saturated and trans fats. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. &
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 2005 at 11 tbl.2 (2005)
(recommending numeric limits on all types of fat, including unsaturated fats), with U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 2010 at 76
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B. Legal Framework of the Dietary Guidelines
This Section outlines the different laws governing the Guidelines.
The Nutrition Act is the organic statute for the Dietary Guidelines,
delineating Congress’s mandate to USDA and HHS. These agencies are
governed by the APA, and the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee
is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). But these
ostensible legal constraints are ineffective, and the Guidelines are
subject to few meaningful safeguards.
The Nutrition Act requires USDA and HHS to publish the
Guidelines every five years. 62 The Guidelines “shall contain nutritional
and dietary information and guidelines for the general public, and shall
be promoted by each Federal agency in carrying out any Federal food,
nutrition, or health program.” 63 Furthermore, the Guidelines “shall be
based on the preponderance of the scientific and medical knowledge
which is current at the time the report is prepared.” 64
The Nutrition Act also provides a process by which “[a]ny Federal
agency that proposes to issue any dietary guidance for the general
population or identified population subgroups shall submit the text of
such guidance to the [USDA and HHS] Secretaries for a sixty-day

(2010) (recommending numeric limits on only saturated fat and total fat). The 2015 Guidelines
reiterated this shift, which reflects the modern scientific understanding that monounsaturated
and polyunsaturated fats from whole foods like nuts and avocados contribute to a healthy diet.
Citizen Petition from KIND LLC to the FDA 1 (Dec. 1, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kind-docs
/citizen-petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/28PL-2LDD] (requesting amendment to the FDA Rules
regarding food labeling health claims). In 2015, FDA issued a warning letter to snack company
KIND regarding the use of “healthy” to market its nutrition bars. Warning Letter from FDA,
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to KIND LLC (Mar. 17, 2015), https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20201218161031/ https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminalinvestigations/warning-letters/kind-llc-03172015 [https://perma.cc/87XX-6QKN]. KIND responded
by submitting a citizen petition to FDA. Citizen Petition from KIND LLC to the FDA, supra
(requesting amendment to the FDA Rules regarding food labeling health claims). Frequently citing
the 2010 and 2015 Guidelines, KIND urged the agency to revise its labeling regulations to reflect
current understandings of healthy eating. Id. at 1, 10–14, 17, 19–20, 26. Under FDA’s current rule,
KIND pointed out, foods like salmon, avocados, and olives could not be labeled healthy while lowfat pudding and sugar cereals met the “healthy” criteria. Id. at 1. In response, FDA initiated
proceedings to consider amending its regulations and issued guidance expressing the agency’s
intent to exercise enforcement discretion relative to foods that use the implied nutrient
content claim “healthy” on their labels which: (1) are not low in total fat, but have a fat
profile makeup of predominantly mono and polyunsaturated fats; or (2) contain at least
ten percent of the Daily Value (DV) per reference amount customarily consumed
(RACC) or potassium or vitamin D.
Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products: Guidance for Industry;
Availability, 81 Fed. Reg. 66527 (Sept. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-09-28/pdf/2016-23367.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8JW-D8AW].
62. 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 5341(a)(2).
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review period.”65 The Secretaries are to review the guidance for
consistency with the Guidelines or valid medical or scientific
knowledge. 66 If either Secretary finds the guidance inconsistent with
the Guidelines, the proposed guidance must be made available for
public comment. 67 The final version must address significant
comments and must receive approval from either the USDA or HHS
Secretary. 68
Beyond the Nutrition Act’s mandate, the APA and FACA also impact
the Guidelines by governing agency activities. The APA governs a broad
range of agency actions, 69 while FACA governs the operation of federal
advisory committees, including the Dietary Guidelines Advisory
Committee. 70 In 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected an APA challenge to the 2010 Guidelines, concluding
that the Guidelines are not reviewable agency action under the APA. 71
There has been only one subsequent challenge to the Guidelines. 72 In
that more recent case, the plaintiffs asserted that USDA and HHS failed
to guard against the “inappropriate influence” of “special interests” on
the Committee in violation of FACA, rendering the Guidelines
“arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law” in violation of the APA. 73
This case was also unsuccessful: the Northern District of California
concluded that FACA did not supply a standard for adjudicating
compliance with the Act. 74
FACA was enacted in response to concerns that federal advisory
committees were inefficient and opaque.75 Since the 1980s, Congress
has directed USDA and HHS to convene a Dietary Guidelines Advisory
Committee, although the agencies continue to have ultimate
responsibility for publishing the Guidelines. 76 The agencies take public

65. Id. § 5341(b)(1); § 5302(9).
66. § 5341(b)(2)(A).
67. Id. § 5341(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).
68. Id. § 5341(b)(2)(B).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
70. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2020 DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER para. 2,
at 1 (2018), https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/DietaryGuidelines
AdvisoryCommitteeCharter-10-05-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/29C9-K6NB] [hereinafter CHARTER].
71. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 2011).
72. Both cases were brought by the same public interest group, the Physicians Committee for
Responsible Medicine.
73. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016).
74. Id. at *1, *3–5.
75. WENDY GINSBURG & CASEY BURGAT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44253, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEES: AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R44253.pdf
[https://perma.cc/778T-Q4J4].
76. CHARTER, supra note 70, para. 3, at 1.
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nominations before selecting the Committee members, 77 who “are not
paid . . . and must report any potential conflicts of interest.” 78 FACA
requires that advisory committee meetings be open to the public and
records be made publicly available, though agency heads have some
discretion to close meetings and withhold records. 79 Under FACA,
agency heads who create an advisory committee must develop a charter
that clearly defines the committee’s purpose and stipulates that its
committee membership be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory
committee.” 80 Agency heads must provide assurance “that the advice
and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be
inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special
interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee’s
independent judgment.” 81
The 2020 Committee charter carries out this charge by providing
that “[s]teps will be taken to encourage fresh points of view, such as
establishing a committee in which most members have not served on a
previous Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee and including
members with varying points of view on the topics and questions to be
examined by the committee.” 82 However, it is difficult to contest the
sufficiency of these efforts. As discussed above, the Northern District of
California held such claims non-justiciable for lack of a meaningful
standard. 83 Unlike the District of Columbia court, the California court
apparently presumed that promulgating the Guidelines constitutes

77. Announcement of Intent to Establish the 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee
and Solicitation of Nominations for Appointment to the Committee Membership, 77 Fed. Reg.
65384 (Oct. 26, 2012).
78. T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief, Final 2015-20 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The
Federal Government Published Its Latest Recommendations Intended to Shape People’s Diets Based on the
Latest Research., HEALTH AFFS., at 2 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hpb20160331.683121/full/healthpolicybrief_155.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP2V-2ZBV].
79. CHARTER, supra note 70, para. 9, at 3.
80. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5, 8, 9. FACA does not directly mandate that advisory committees be
fairly balanced; rather, it sets out requirements for committee charters. Id.
81. § 5(b)(3).
82. CHARTER, supra note 70, para. 12, at 4.
83. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016). There is an exception to judicial review under the APA where the
action’s authorizing statute is “‘drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply.’” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. No.
752, at 212 (1945)), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). Where Congress has used
such broad language, the action is considered “committed to agency discretion by law.” Id.; 5
U.S.C. § 701(a). This is a very narrow exception which must overcome the “strong presumption
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam.
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). Because FACA and the Nutrition Act do not define
“inappropriate influence” or “special interest,” the court would not interfere with the agency’s
decisions about who to include on the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee. Physicians Comm.,
2016 WL 5930585, at *3–8.
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agency action. But it nonetheless declined to review them under FACA
or the APA, reasoning that neither FACA nor the Nutrition Act provide a
sufficiently justiciable standard. 84
While the APA and FACA may formally govern the Guidelines, their
protections are ineffective while judicial review remains unavailable.
Without any safeguards against undue influence, the Guidelines have
fallen into the hands of the food industry.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS
Despite the Guidelines’ widespread impact, or perhaps because of
it, they have continued to be the subject of criticism. These critiques
have centered on conflicts of interest among agency officials and
Committee members, the transparency of agency decision-making,
and the scientific rigor of the Guidelines’ recommendations. On one
side, many scientists and scholars believe that the Guidelines are
unduly influenced by the food industry and thus do not reflect modern
nutrition science. 85 They point to the Guidelines’ failure to recommend
reduced consumption of red meat and processed foods despite pleas
from the scientific community to do so. 86 Other experts—along with
meat, dairy, and sugar producers and low-carb diet advocates—argue
that the Guidelines meekly adhere to the status quo despite new
scientific knowledge. 87 These stakeholders point to the Guidelines’
longstanding recommendation to limit saturated fat intake to less than
ten percent of total calories. 88 They argue that recent findings
contradict the long-held belief that fat is harmful, rendering this
guidance outdated. 89 This Part examines the Guidelines’ recent history,
which illustrates their key shortcomings, and then discusses these
shortcomings in more detail.
In 2015, the Guidelines became embroiled in their most heated
controversy since their creation. The core advice put forth in the
Committee report, which USDA and HHS officials use to develop the
Guidelines, was consistent with prior editions: eat more fruit,
vegetables, and whole grains, and eat less saturated fat, sodium, and

84. Physicians Comm., 2016 WL 5930585, at *3–8.
85. See, e.g., James J. DiNicolantonio, Zoë Harcombe & James H. O’Keefe, Problems with the
2015 Dietary Guidelines for Americans: An Alternative, 113 MO. MED. 93 (2016); NESTLE, supra note 29;
Hassink & Stack, supra note 11.
86. See sources cited supra note 85.
87. See The Issue, NUTRITION COAL., https://www.nutritioncoalition.us/the-issue [https://perma.cc
/CKQ3-WX75].
88. Dietary Guidelines 101, NUTRITION COAL., https://www.nutritioncoalition.us/dietaryguidelines-for-americans-dga-introduction [https://perma.cc/78TL-8DMD].
89. Id.
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added sugars. 90 But the Committee also made a number of bold
recommendations. The report explicitly warned against sugary
beverages and artificial sweeteners 91 and recommended a quantitative
limit on added sugar—less than ten percent of total calories—as well as
a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages.92 The Committee also advised
USDA and HHS to drop the 300 mg cap on cholesterol intake that had
been introduced in 2010. 93 And most controversially, the Committee
report recommended that Americans eat less red and processed meat,
in part to promote better individual health outcomes and in part to
promote the long-term health of humankind by shifting to more
sustainable food sources. 94
The Committee’s report triggered many negative reactions. Health
advocates protested the elimination of a cholesterol cap, arguing that
the Committee was improperly influenced by the egg industry. 95 Food
and beverage producers bristled at the recommendations to limit
sugary beverages and red meat. 96 The meat industry was particularly
concerned about sustainability playing a role in the development of the
Guidelines. 97 This backlash compelled Agriculture Secretary Tom
Vilsack to assuage critics’ fears. Secretary Vilsack compared the
Committee members to his three- and five-year-old grandchildren,
who he described as still learning to color inside the lines. 98 He
promised, “I am going to color inside the lines.” 99 While sustainability
may seem “outside the lines” of the Guidelines, the Committee justified
these recommendations with an eye toward food insecurity and longterm health. 100 This was not the first time that the Guidelines
considered similarly “marginal” factors. For example, in the 1930s
USDA began publishing cost-conscious meal plans. 101 Even physical
exercise, which the Guidelines regularly incorporate into

90. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF THE 2015 DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 2 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT].
91. See id. at 342, 346.
92. Id. at 28, 347.
93. Id. at 58.
94. See id. at 3, 5.
95. Marion Nestle, Perspective: Challenges and Controversial Issues in the Dietary Guidelines for
Americans, 1980-2015, 9 ADVANCES NUTRITION 148, 148–49 (2018).
96. Id.; see Press Release, Sugar Ass’n, The Sugar Association Responds to 2015 Guidelines
(Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sugar.org/resources/releases/the-sugar-association-responds-to-2015dietary-guidelines-advisory-committee-report/ [https://perma.cc/WRA3-R59M].
97. Nestle, supra note 95, at 149.
98. Vilsack Likens Dietary Guidelines Committee to 3-Year-Old, HAGSTROM REP. (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://www.hagstromreport.com/2015news_files/2015_0227_vilsack-likens-dietary-guidelinescommittee-3-year-old.html [https://perma.cc/2UAB-SN38].
99. Id.
100. 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT, supra note 90, at 5.
101. Davis & Saltos, supra note 16, at 35.
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recommendations, is arguably outside the bounds of a narrow, literal
definition of “nutritional and dietary information.” 102
Despite these assurances, the industry’s concerns made it all the
way to Congress. Members of Congress wrote three bipartisan letters
urging the USDA and HHS Secretaries to reconsider the Committee’s
guidance on red meat and to extend the public comment period for the
guidelines. 103 The Secretaries granted the latter request and extended
the forty-five-day comment period to seventy days, ending on May 8,
2015. 104 While the representatives did not hide that meat was the focus
of their concerns, they also emphasized the scope of the Committee’s
task, saying that the Committee “had neither the expertise, evidence,
nor charter” to address issues of sustainability and tax policy. 105 On May
14, representatives wrote to Secretaries Vilsack and Burwell advising
them to carefully review the significant number of public comments
submitted on the Committee report. 106 In June, in an unprecedented
move, Committee members wrote to Congress protesting legislative
interference with their scientific process. 107 In July, senators sent
another letter to the Secretaries. 108 This time, they urged the agencies to
base the Guidelines on “sound scientific evidence and current medical
knowledge” and to limit the degree to which recommendations are

102. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DIETARY
GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 2010, at 18 (2010), https://health.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/
DietaryGuidelines2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LJW-BNC8]; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NUTRITION AND YOUR HEALTH: DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 15
(1995), https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/1995%20Dietary%20Guidelines%
20for%20Americans.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKT4-MC6T].
103. E.g., Senators Roberts, Stabenow, Alexander and Murray Call for Extension of Dietary Guidelines
Comment Period, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION & FORESTRY (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.agriculture.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senators-roberts-stabenow-alexander-andmurray-call-for-extension-of-dietary-guidelines-comment-period [https://perma.cc/4FL7-YX9C];
see also Congress Is Concerned, NUTRITION COAL., https://www.nutritioncoalition.us/congress-isconcerned#:~:text=HEARING,the%20Guidelines%20are%20not%20working [https://perma.cc/
QCD5-ZMXK].
104. Solicitation of Written Comments on the Scientific Report of the 2015 Dietary Guidelines
Advisory Committee, 80 Fed. Reg. 18852 (Apr. 8, 2015).
105. Letter from Various Members of Congress to Secretaries Vilsack and Burwell (Mar. 31,
2015), https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.31.15_dietary_guidelines_letter_
to_secs_vilsack_burwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7P9-Z8Z7].
106. Letter from House Agriculture Committee to Secretaries Vilsack and Burwell (May 14,
2015), https://archives-agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/pdf/
HAC%20Burwell%20Vilsack%20DGA%20Questions%20051415_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LVU6WUXG].
107. Letter from 2015 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Comm. to the U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Appropriations (June 22, 2015), https://www.foodpolitics.com/wpcontent/uploads/dgac_appropriations_bill_response_6_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RNZ-9GCE].
108. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. & Pensions, Chairmen
Roberts, Alexander Urge Sound Science in 2015 Dietary Guidelines, (July 7, 2015), https://
www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/-chairmen-roberts-alexander-urge-sound-sciencein-2015-dietary-guidelines [https://perma.cc/NMS8-G5ZR].
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“agenda-driven.” 109 Ironically, the representatives who signed these
letters were accused of having a hidden agenda themselves: promoting
the interests of their campaign donors from the food industry. 110 “Every
state has cattle and every state has two senators,” said Dr. Marion
Nestle, a leading nutrition scholar who served on the 1995 Committee
and reviewed the 2015 Guidelines. 111 “So [the food industry is]
powerful.” 112
In October 2015, the House Committee on Agriculture held a
hearing to address concerns about the Guidelines. 113 In addition to the
issue of whether sustainability should be considered, representatives
raised concerns about the methods for selecting and screening
evidence; the appropriateness of the Guidelines for children; the lack of
transparency with respect to potential conflicts of interest on the
Committee; and the overall nutritional sufficiency of USDArecommended diets. 114 Secretaries Vilsack and Burwell ceded to at least
some of these concerns prior to the hearing; in a joint statement, they
communicated their view that “we do not believe that the 2015
[Guidelines] are the appropriate vehicle for this important policy
conversation about sustainability.” 115
Unconvinced, Congress took matters into its own hands and put
additional safeguards in place. In December, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2016 included two riders regarding the
Guidelines. First, Congress prohibited USDA and HHS from releasing
the Guidelines unless any revisions or new recommendations are
“based on significant scientific agreement” and “limited in scope to
nutritional and dietary information.”116 Second, Congress appropriated
$1 million for the Agriculture Secretary to engage the National
Academies to conduct a comprehensive review of the entire Guidelines
process and provide recommendations for improvement. 117
109. Id.
110. Laura MacCleery, Opinion, Leave the Science Alone on Dietary Guidelines 2015, HILL (July 3, 2015),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/246679-leave-the-science-alone-on-dietary-guidelines-2015
[https://perma.cc/JQ9Z-DHBE].
111. Helena Bottemiller Evich, Meat Industry Wins Round in War over Federal Nutrition Advice,
POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/2015-dietary-guidelines-217438
[https://perma.cc/GY9H-YJ7P].
112. Id.
113. Congress Is Concerned, NUTRITION COAL., https://www.nutritioncoalition.us/congress-isconcerned [https://perma.cc/DU6E-86EY].
114. Id.
115. Tom Vilsack & Sylvia Burwell, 2015 Dietary Guidelines: Giving You the Tools You Need to Make
Healthy Choices, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2015/10/06
/2015-dietary-guidelines-giving-you-tools-you-need-make-healthy-choices [https://perma.cc/9KLJJS34].
116. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 734, 129 Stat. 2241, 2280
(2015).
117. Id. § 735.
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When USDA and HHS issued the Guidelines in January 2016, they
deviated substantially from the Committee’s recommendations, but
provided little justification. They excluded the Committee’s
recommendations to cut back on red meat and processed foods. 118
Instead, the 2015 Guidelines included red meat, along with seafood,
poultry, and other protein sources as elements of a healthy eating
pattern. 119 Yet they also diplomatically noted that “[l]ower intakes of
meats . . . have often been identified as characteristics of healthy eating
patterns.” 120 Additionally, the 2015 Guidelines’ recommendations to
limit saturated fat to less than 10% of calories and sodium to less than
2300 mg would, in practice, necessarily require limiting intakes of red
meat. 121 The agencies also excluded the Committee’s recommendations
to reduce consumption of sugary beverages but retained the new limit
on added sugar. This illustrates a trend in the Guidelines of obfuscating
advice by referring to actual foods in the “eat more” recommendations
(i.e., eat more vegetables and whole grains), but referring to individual
nutrients in the “eat less” recommendations (i.e., eat less saturated fat
and added sugar). 122 The Guidelines also retained the Committee’s
recommendation to eliminate the cholesterol limit, announcing that
cholesterol is no longer a “nutrient of concern.” 123 Yet at the same time,
the Guidelines still advise that “individuals should eat as little dietary
cholesterol as possible.” 124 This ambiguous advice led to public
confusion, exacerbated by a media frenzy, 125 and ultimately sowed
distrust in the Guidelines. 126

118. Compare 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT, supra note 90, at 3, 5, with DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–
2020, supra note 5, at 35.
119. DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at 35.
120. Id. at 17, 25.
121. Elizabeth Crawford, 2015 Dietary Guidelines Soften Many Controversial Suggestions, but Still
Advocate Eating More Plants, FOOD NAVIGATOR USA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com
/Article/2016/01/07/2015-Dietary-Guidelines-soften-controversial-suggestions [https://perma.cc
/944P-UCT8].
122. See DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at xiii.
123. 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT, supra note 90, at 58; DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5,
at 32.
124. DIETARY GUIDELINES 2015–2020, supra note 5, at 32.
125. See, e.g., Editorial, Scientists Get Egg on Their Faces, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 23, 2015), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-cholesterol-guidelines-edit-0223-20150220story.html [https://perma.cc/PX9M-RF4F]; James Hamblin, The Earnest Simplicity of the New
Nutrition Guidelines, ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02
/the-new-best-way-to-eat/385659/ [https://perma.cc/Q373-8N9L].
126. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 78, at 5 (“Removing previously established nutritional
norms, however, comes at a cost, as House Agriculture Committee ranking member Collin
Peterson (D-MN) reminded HHS secretary Burwell and USDA secretary Vilsack during an October
7, 2015, hearing on the Committee report. ‘From my constituents, most of them don’t believe this
stuff anymore,’ said Peterson. ‘You have lost your credibility with a lot of people, and they are just
flat out ignoring this stuff.’”); Crawford, supra note 121 (“[O]stensibly conflicting interpretations
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Pursuant to the 2015 congressional appropriation discussed above,
the National Academies released in two reports in 2017 detailing their
findings and recommendations with respect to their review of the
Dietary Guidelines process. The first report, published early in the year,
focused on the Committee selection process. 127 The National Academies
recommended third-party nomination and a transparent conflict-ofinterest process for Committee members. 128 The second report
confirmed those recommendations and also proposed ways to improve
the Guidelines’ development process as a whole. 129 In response, USDA
and HHS promised to incorporate some of the recommendations (or
parts of the recommendations), deferred responding to a few
recommendations until later in the 2020 Guidelines process, and
declined to implement others, citing limited resources, time
constraints, and Committee members’ privacy. 130 The National
Academies recommended an external nomination process for
Committee members based on objective criteria developed by USDA
and HHS. 131 Citing resource constraints, the agencies did not use a
third-party, but did create a list of criteria for selecting Committee
members. 132
The National Academies also suggested redistributing the current
functions of the Committee to three separate bodies: a planning and
continuity group, to curate evidence and identify and prioritize topics
for inclusion in the Guidelines; technical expert panels, to provide
content and methodological consultation during evaluation of the

likely will lead to increased confusion by consumers and trigger additional education campaigns by
both sides.”).
127. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., OPTIMIZING THE PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING THE
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS: THE SELECTION PROCESS (2017) [hereinafter OPTIMIZING THE
PROCESS].
128. Id. at 3–5.
129. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., REDESIGNING THE PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING THE
DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 4–15 (2017) [hereinafter REDESIGNING THE PROCESS].
130. DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMS., USDA-HHS RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF
SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, & MEDICINE: SELECTING THE DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(2018), https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/USDA%20HHS%20Response%
20to%20HMD%20Report%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/94SD-R2Z8] [hereinafter USDA-HHS
RESPONSE: SELECTION PROCESS]; Dietary Guidelines for Ams., Day 1: Thursday, March 28, 2019,
Responding to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Study on the Process to Update
the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/day-1responding-national-academies-sciences-engineering-and-medicine-study-process-establish
[https://perma.cc/5RJR-ZEAN] (Source: USDA YouTube content) (Speaker: Eve Stoody, Designated
Fed. Officer & Lead Nutritionist) [hereinafter Stoody]; see also Government Rejects Most of National
Academies’ Recs for Improving the Dietary Guidelines’ Advisory Committee, NUTRITION COAL. (Sept. 25,
2018), https://www.nutritioncoalition.us/news/2018/9/25/government-rejects-most-of-nationalacademies-recs-for-improving-the-dietary-guidelines-advisory-Committee [https://perma.cc/
67LV-LH77].
131. OPTIMIZING THE PROCESS, supra note 127, at 5–8.
132. USDA-HHS RESPONSE: SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 130, at 2.
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evidence; and a scientific advisory committee, to interpret the scientific
evidence and draw conclusions. 133 USDA and HHS rejected this overall
strategy but said that the agencies would, with public input, identify
the topics and questions prior to establishing the Committee. 134
Thus, in 2020, HHS and USDA predetermined for the first time the
topics that the Guidelines would address. The eighty questions tasked
to the Committee fail to address several of the most controversial issues
raised in 2015. 135 For example, the 2020 Committee did not explore the
consumption of red meat or processed foods or the appropriate sodium
levels for different populations. 136 Dr. Nestle commented: “The cuttingedge issues in dietary advice in 2019 are about eating less meat,
avoidance of ultra-processed foods, and sustainable production and
consumption. . . . Guidelines that avoid these issues will be years
behind the times.” 137 Though focusing the Committee’s inquiry is
ostensibly an effort to “promote a deliberate and transparent
process,”138 the result is to prevent the Committee from considering the
most important topics in nutrition.
USDA and HHS also limited the research that the 2020 Committee
could consider to studies vetted through an opaque process by USDA’s
own research team. 139 USDA additionally prohibited the Committee
from considering research conducted before 2000 (except in the case of
the early childhood subcommittee). Historically, the Committee had
latitude to consult with outside experts and draw on research from a
variety of sources both inside and outside USDA. 140 Though purportedly
in furtherance of the National Academies’ recommendations, these
decisions contradicted the National Academies’ conclusion that it
133. REDESIGNING THE PROCESS, supra note 129, at 9.
134. Stoody, supra note 130.
135. Reiley, supra note 8.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Process to Identify the Topics and Questions, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMS., https://
www.dietaryguidelines.gov/resources/about-process/process-identify-topics-and-questions
[https://perma.cc/UYT7-CS58].
139. Reiley, supra note 8. USDA’s main research entity for the Guidelines, known as the
Nutrition Evidence Systematic Review team, conducts systematic reviews of nutrition literature
for each question posed to the Committee. Systematic Reviews for the 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory
Committee, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://nesr.usda.gov/2020-dietary-guidelines-advisory-committeesystematic-reviews [https://perma.cc/P8G5-UBZU]. The process by which studies are screened and
reviewed is only facially transparent. Studies are screened primarily using predetermined
inclusion and exclusion criteria. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2020 DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE: NUTRITION EVIDENCE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW (NESR) PROCESS FOR CONDUCTING
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 5 (2020). While USDA publicizes the general categories of these criteria—
study design, group size, publication status, etc.—the particular criteria used are unknown. See id.
at 7. Moreover, USDA’s role in promoting industry-funded research compromises the entire
endeavor from the beginning. See First Amended Complaint at 3, Physicians Comm. for
Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016).
140. Reiley, supra note 8.
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would be advantageous for the Guidelines to leverage a variety of
existing research. 141
More than thirty advocacy organizations, including the American
Institute for Cancer Research and the American Academy of Pediatrics,
petitioned the Committee to cast a wider net. 142 They argued that
excluding outside science diminishes the Committee’s efficacy given
that the 2015 Committee used outside science to answer nearly half of
its research questions. 143 Another group of nutrition experts wrote to
the Committee expressing concern that USDA’s decision to exclude pre2000 research excludes much of the highest-quality evidence on dietary
fats and cardiovascular disease. 144 This approach has a substantial
impact on the conclusions drawn from the evidence, particularly given
that research in general has become increasingly industry-funded in
recent years and is thus more susceptible to bias. 145 For example, a
meta-analysis of forty-one studies showed that in 1992, 29% of studies
on dietary cholesterol were paid for by industry, mainly the egg
industry. 146 In 2013, meta-analysis found that 83% of dietary cholesterol
studies published since 2003 were industry-funded. 147
After these letters and some media buzz, USDA walked back its
earlier prohibition on outside data, saying that the “[C]ommittee will
review all original, peer-reviewed, published research and data that
meets rigorous criteria.” 148 However, the 2020 Committee report does
not mention using any external data in its methodology. 149 And despite
the backlash, USDA continues to tout its topic selection and research
vetting as transparency measures, when they in truth represent efforts
to constrain the scientific committee and maintain a tight grip on the
Guidelines. 150
141. REDESIGNING THE PROCESS, supra note 129, at 13.
142. Letter from various advocacy groups to Barbara Schneeman, Chair, 2020 Dietary
Guidelines Advisory Comm. (July 22, 2019), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment
/AICR%20DGAC%20Comments_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCM9-5T4P].
143. Id.
144. Letter from Henry Blackburn et al., to Barbara Schneeman, Chair, 2020–2025 Dietary
Guidelines Advisory Comm. (July 24, 2019), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/
Scientist%20Comment%20to%20DGAC%20re%20Dietary%20Fats%20and%20CVD%20Protocol%2
07-24-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/V29D-5TRE].
145. First Amended Complaint at 2–3, Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No.
16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016).
146. Neal D. Barnard, M. Blaire Long, Jennifer M. Ferguson, Rosendo Flores & Hana
Kahleova, Industry Funding and Cholesterol Research: A Systematic Review, 15 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 165,
171 (2019).
147. Id. (finding ten out of twelve studies were industry-funded).
148. Reiley, supra note 8.
149. See 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT, supra note 90, at 2.
150. Contra U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MAKE EVERY BITE
COUNT WITH THE DIETARY GUIDELINES 7–10 (2020), https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/
default/files/2020-12/DGA_2020-2025_Infographic_MakeEveryBiteCount.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TZZ7-HXE6].
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The chaos surrounding the Guidelines in 2015 and 2020 illustrates
some of their many shortcomings. The food and beverage industry
pressured
agencies
to
overrule—without
explanation—the
recommendations of an already-captured scientific advisory
committee. To prevent further scrutiny, the agencies curtailed future
committees by limiting the science that the scientists may consider.
A. Conflicts of Interest
Perhaps the longest-standing criticism of the Guidelines is that the
process of creating them is rife with conflicts of interest, resulting in
recommendations that are unduly influenced by industry rather than
wholly based in science. This concern focuses largely on the
composition of the Committee. At the direction of Congress, the first
Committee was established in 1983 in response to concerns that the
1980 Guidelines were not scientifically sound. 151 Typically, the selection
process begins with a public notice in the Federal Register announcing a
call for nominations and describing the role and qualifications
sought. 152 Agency officials then make the final selections. 153
Despite federal requirements and recent efforts to reduce bias, each
Committee continues to come under fire. 154 Industry representation has
increased steadily over time: three out of eleven members on the 1995
Committee had past or present industry ties; seven out of eleven
members on the 2000 Committee; eleven out of thirteen members on
the 2005 Committee; and nine out of thirteen members on the 2010
Committee. 155 These ties include trade associations for meat, dairy,
eggs, sugar, pharmaceuticals, as well as many individual companies. 156
USDA and HHS faced a lawsuit in 2016 when a scientist who conducted
egg industry-funded cholesterol research was appointed Vice Chair of

151. AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44360, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2016) (citing S. REP. NO. 96-1030 (1980)).
152. OPTIMIZING THE PROCESS, supra note 127, at 32; e.g., Announcement of Intent to Establish
the 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee and Solicitation of Nominations for
Membership, 83 Fed. Reg. 45206 (Sept. 6, 2018).
153. OPTIMIZING THE PROCESS, supra note 127, at 33–34.
154. See, e.g., Brooke Aksnes, Maria Alvim & Sarah Garduño-Diaz, The Normalization of Conflicts
of Interest in the USA and Their Potential Impact on Public Health Nutrition, 8 WORLD NUTRITION 123
(2017).
155. Linda Carney, Big Industry’s Influence on USDA Food Guidelines, VEGWORLD MAG. (Nov. 25,
2018), https://vegworldmag.com/big-industry-s-influence-on-usda-food-guidelines/ [https://
perma.cc/AT64-GP4X].
156. Id.
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the Committee and Chair of the subcommittee that dealt with the issue
of dietary cholesterol. 157
The prevalence of industry ties among the 2020 Committee
members may exceed that of any prior Committee. 158 Thirteen of the
twenty members have ties to industry. 159 For example:
·

·

·

·

Dr. Heather Leidy received funding from the National Pork
Board to conduct a 2012 study that found long-term health
benefits of pork-based breakfasts—compared to adolescents
who normally skip breakfast altogether, but not compared to
any other reference groups. 160
Dr. Lydia Bazzano was nominated to the Committee by Atkins
Nutritionals after her research on the short-term effects of
low-carbohydrate diets on weight loss and cardiovascular risk
factors helped boost the popularity of the Atkins Diet.161
Dr. Jamy Ard is the Medical Director for Nestlé’s Optifast, a
food-replacement supplement. 162 He serves on Nestlé’s
advisory board and has received funding from Nestle to study
Optifast. 163
Dr. Steven Heymsfield, nominated by the American Beverage
Association, has been on the scientific advisory board of
Medifast, a weight loss product. 164 He is also the current
president of The Obesity Society, an organization that has
been criticized for connections to corporate funders such as
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. 165

157. First Amended Complaint at 10–11, Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack,
No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016).
158. Reiley, supra note 8.
159. Id.
160. Derrick Z. Jackson, Food Companies at the Table in Trump Administration’s Dietary Guidelines
Committee, EQUATION (Apr. 1, 2019), https://blog.ucsusa.org/derrick-jackson/trumpadministrations-dietary-guidelines-committee/ [https://perma.cc/YS9F-R6HB] (citing Heather J.
Leidy, Heather A. Hoertel, Steve M. Douglas, Kelly A. Higgins & Rebecca S. Shafer, A High-Protein
Breakfast Prevents Body Fat Gain, Through Reductions in Daily Intake and Hunger, in “Breakfast Skipping”
Adolescents, 23 OBESITY J. 1761 (2015)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Dr. Ard’s Nestlé-funded studies have shown that Optifast diets lead to more weight loss
than food-based diets. Jamy D. Ard, Kristina H. Lewis, Amy Rothberg, Anthony Auriemma, Sally
L. Coburn, Sarah S. Cohen, Judy Loper, Laura Matarese, Walter J. Pories & Seletha Periman,
Effectiveness of a Total Meal Replacement Program (OPTIFAST Program) on Weight Loss: Results from the
OPTIWIN Study, 27 OBESITY J. 22, 22 (2019). A 2015 study by Johns Hopkins University researchers
found that very few commercial weight-loss programs demonstrate long-term benefits, and
Optifast is not one of them. Kimberly A. Gudzune, Ruchi S. Doshi, Ambereen K. Mehta, Zoobia W.
Chaudhry, David K. Jacobs, Rachit M. Vakil, Clare J. Lee, Sara N. Bleich & Jeanne M. Clark, Efficacy
of Commercial Weight Loss Programs, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 501, 508–09 (2016).
164. Jackson, supra note 160.
165. Id.
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Five Committee members are affiliated with the International
Life Sciences Institute, an organization founded by a CocaCola executive “to unite the food industry.” 166 The organization
has repeatedly been criticized for its efforts to manipulate
scientific studies on behalf of food companies. 167

Although these criticisms typically come from commentors who believe
that modern science points away from red and processed meats, promeat advocates are also displeased. The Nutrition Coalition, a pro-meat
organization whose research has been heavily criticized, 168 expressed
concern over Committee members who received funding from
organizations financially interested in plant consumption, such as the
Almond Board of California, the National Peanut Board, and the
California Walnut Commission, among other organizations. 169
Many consider conflicts par for the course when it comes to the
Committee, especially given the frequency with which industry funds
research and the propensity of experts to serve in a variety of advisory
roles. Even the National Academies’ report noted that “the [National
Academies] committee does not believe that these influences can be
eliminated entirely.” 170 However, these conflicts are particularly
troublesome given that the USDA officials who translated the 2020
Committee’s work had unprecedented levels of industry conflicts. 171 The
process was entirely devoid of an unconflicted party free of incentive to
manipulate the Guidelines to their benefit. 172
Moreover, inherent institutional conflicts undermine the
Guidelines’ declared goal of disseminating evidence-based nutrition
policy. The Secretary of Agriculture is specifically mandated by
Congress to promote and develop markets for domestic agricultural
products. 173 USDA’s duty to promote the agricultural industry is
fundamentally at odds with promoting health and preventing chronic

166. Id.
167. Id.; Stacy Malkan, International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) Is a Food Industry Lobby Group,
U.S. RIGHT TO KNOW (Apr. 19, 2021), https://usrtk.org/sweeteners/ilsi-wields-stealthy-influencefor-the-food-and-agrichemical-industries/ [https://perma.cc/AT64-GP4X].
168. Shannon Palus, BMJ Corrects Controversial Critique of U.S. Dietary Guidelines Report, RETRACTION
WATCH (Oct. 28, 2015), https://retractionwatch.com/2015/10/28/bmj-corrects-controversial-critiqueof-us-dietary-guidelines-report/ [https://perma.cc/SS4W-MA4M].
169. Who’s on the Guidelines Committee, NUTRITION COAL. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://
www.nutritioncoalition.us/news/2020-dietary-guidelines-Committee [https://perma.cc/49FY-JBN5].
170. OPTIMIZING THE PROCESS, supra note 127, at 9.
171. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, BETRAYAL AT THE USDA: HOW THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION IS SIDELINING SCIENCE AND FAVORING INDUSTRY OVER FARMERS AND THE PUBLIC 2
(2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/04/betrayal-at-the-usda-reportucs-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF26-NACH].
172. See id.
173. 7 U.S.C. § 1622(e)(1).
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diseases. 174 Dr. Nestle says of her time on the Committee: “I was told we
could never say ‘eat less meat’ because USDA would not allow it.” 175 Dr.
Robert Lustig, co-founder and president of the Institute for
Responsible Nutrition, says “tasking the government agency that
manages America’s food production with crafting nutrition policy is
akin to ‘putting the fox in charge of the hen house.’” 176
In sum, neither the members of the Committee, the agency
officials, nor the agencies as institutions are independent actors
committed to developing scientifically sound Dietary Guidelines.
B. Transparency
The work of the Committee has always been fairly transparent, as
required under FACA, and advocacy groups have been able to procure
additional records through FOIA requests. 177 But where agency officials
become involved, the process becomes opaque because these officials
have no obligation to make records publicly available. 178 Prior to 2005,
the Committee wrote the actual Guidelines in addition to writing a
Committee report. 179 Since 2005, the agencies have written the
Guidelines themselves, “separating the science from the actual
guidelines and making the process more political.” 180 The National
Academies recommended that the agencies explain any deviations from
the Committee report in future Guidelines. 181 The agencies agreed to do
so, but their candor has yet to be tested by controversial Committee
recommendations (and may never truly be tested due to the agencies
restricting future Committees to predetermined topics). 182

174. E.g., Marya Torrez, Meatless Monday: Simple Public Health Suggestion or Extremist Plot?, 28 J.
ENV’T L. & LITIG. 515, 516 (2013); Jeff Herman, Saving U.S. Dietary Advice from Conflicts of Interest, 65
FOOD DRUG L.J. 285, 285 (2010); Melissa D. Mortazavi, Are Food Subsidies Making Our Kids Fat?
Tensions Between the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act and the Farm Bill, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1699, 1706
(2011).
175. Heid, supra note 13.
176. Id.
177. E.g., Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Glickman, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2000).
178. See REDESIGNING THE PROCESS, supra note 129, at 12 (recommending that the agencies
provide transparency during this process and explain any deviations from the Committee report).
179. Nestle, supra note 95, at 148.
180. Id.
181. REDESIGNING THE PROCESS, supra note 129, at 12.
182. USDA-HHS Response to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: Using the
Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee’s Report to Develop the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 20202025, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMS., https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/about-dietary-guidelines/
related-projects/usda-hhs-response-national-academies-sciences-engineering [https://perma.cc/
8YKP-EZQ8].

500

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

C. Public Participation & Accountability
There is little accountability built into the Guidelines, as
demonstrated by the agencies’ complete discretion to accept or reject
the National Academies’ recommendations without justification.
Similarly, although the agencies frequently solicit public input, they are
under no obligation to address such contributions. 183 The 2015
Committee report received a record 29,000 comments; 19,000
addressed the issue of sustainability, with 97% of these comments
supporting the Guidelines’ inclusion of sustainability. 184 Despite clear
consensus among public commenters, USDA and HHS excluded
sustainability from the final Guidelines. 185 The public is also invited to
nominate Committee members and to comment on proposed topics,
but agencies do not need to respond to these comments or explain their
decision-making in light of the public’s concerns. 186 Opportunities for
public participation have improved with each iteration of the
Guidelines, but opportunities for meaningful public participation
remain stagnant. 187 Furthermore, the opportunities that do exist can be
dominated by industry: 68% of public comments on the 2020
Committee report were submitted by food and beverage industry
groups. 188
The National Academies’ review of the Guidelines development
process arguably supplies some accountability. But the agencies’ ability
to cherry-pick which recommendations to adopt rendered the review
process relatively superficial. And scraps of accountability should not
require million-dollar congressional appropriations. 189 Moreover,
because of the pervasive influence of the food industry over
congresspeople of a wide range of ideologies, 190 this area requires more

183. See generally Public Comments to USDA and HHS, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMS., https://
www.dietaryguidelines.gov/public-comments-departments [https://perma.cc/CNT6-D7AG].
184. Margaret Sova McCabe, Eating for the Environment: The Potential of Dietary Guidelines to
Achieve Better Human and Environmental Health Outcomes, 47 ENV’T L. 741, 751–52 (2017).
185. Id. at 752.
186. See Public Comments to USDA and HHS, supra note 183.
187. For example, for the 2020 edition, the agencies introduced a new process through which
the public could submit comments on which topics the Committee should consider when
developing the Guidelines. Process to Identify the Topics and Questions, supra note 138. But as discussed
above, because the agencies had no obligation to address these comments, this effort actually
allowed the agencies to limit the scope of the Committee’s review under the guise of increasing
public participation.
188. Laura Reiley, New U.S. Dietary Guideline Recommendations Take Aim at Sugar for Children and
Adults, WASH. POST (July 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/11/sugar2020-dietary-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/HBD9-KVUG].
189. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 735, 129 Stat. 2242,
2280 (2015).
190. See Evich, supra note 111.
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direct accountability to the public—which, as of this writing, is
nonexistent.
D. Coordination Among Agencies
The task of setting American nutrition policy is divided between
USDA and HHS. 191 Within HHS, the Office of Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion (ODPHP) is responsible for collaborating with USDA
to develop the Guidelines. 192 The Guidelines then inform FDA labeling
regulations, 193 though such regulations are not required to align with
the Guidelines. 194 FDA, housed within HHS, has authority over most
food products, but the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within
USDA is responsible for regulating labels on meat and poultry
products. 195 When FDA labeling became mandatory for most foods in
1990, FSIS adopted the policy of conforming to FDA’s regulations as
much as possible, in the interest of providing consistent regulation for
all foods, 196 but the two sets of regulations do differ in some substantial
ways. 197
As previously discussed, FDA has taken steps in recent years to
conform its labeling regime to the Guidelines. But FDA’s labeling rules
are promulgated as agency regulations, not mere guidance, so they are
not statutorily required to conform. 198 From 1973 until 2016, FDA’s
nutrition facts labels used the %DVs determined by the National
Academies in 1968. 199 They remained unchanged for more than forty
years despite updated understandings of nutrition science that were
reflected in the Guidelines.

191. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (establishing the National Nutrition Monitoring and
Related Research Program, which is jointly coordinated by USDA and HHS).
192. See Dietary Guidelines for Americans, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://
health.gov/our-work/food-nutrition [https://perma.cc/9DN5-MHA9].
193. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
194. See 7 U.S.C. § 5341(b)(3) (exempting “any rule or regulation issued by a Federal agency”
from the class of dietary guidance requiring review by the USDA and HHS Secretaries).
195. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL FOOD LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEAT,
POULTRY, AND EGG PRODUCTS 4-6 (2007).
196. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND
SYMBOLS: PHASE 1 REPORT 15 (Ellen A. Wartella, Alice H. Lichtenstein & Caitlin S. Boon, eds., 2010).
197. For example, in 2003, FDA issued a final rule requiring trans fats to be listed separately
from total fat; USDA regulations permit but do not require trans fats to be separately declared.
Compare Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrition Content Claims, and
Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41434 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (requiring
that FDA-regulated food labels list trans fat content), with 9 C.F.R. § 317.362 (permitting but not
requiring that FSIS-regulated food labels list trans fat content).
198. See 7 U.S.C. § 5341(b)(3) (exempting “any rule or regulation issued by a Federal agency”
from the class of dietary guidance requiring review by the USDA and HHS Secretaries).
199. BARBARA A. BREHM, FOOD LABELS: YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED 16 (2019).
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This more conservative approach has its advantages as well. While
the 2015 Guidelines eliminated cholesterol as a nutrient of concern,
FDA has chosen to continue requiring cholesterol on nutrition labels. 200
The Guidelines’ ambiguous advice—eliminating the cholesterol limit
but still recommending consuming as little cholesterol as possible—has
caused confusion and created distrust in the Guidelines. 201 But having
multiple agencies set inconsistent nutrition policy only furthers those
problems.
The current division of duties also creates a concerning dynamic.
FDA retains discretion to deviate from the Guidelines as it sees fit. Yet
when the recommendations align, FDA uses the Guidelines to justify its
regulations, often with little additional reasoning. 202 When FDA
sometimes does not trust the Guidelines, why should we trust FDA
when it does?
E. Judicial Review
Despite their far-ranging effects on American diets, the Guidelines
are effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review. This
exacerbates each of the problems previously discussed by precluding
the courts as an avenue for reform. With the courthouse doors closed,
the Guidelines’ rehabilitation essentially requires an act of Congress.
As discussed earlier in this Part, the D.C. District Court held that
the Guidelines are not an agency action subject to the APA, 203 and the
Northern District of California held that challenges to the Committee’s
composition are non-justiciable under both the APA and FACA. 204 While
public interest groups have successfully sued USDA for violating FACA’s
information disclosure requirements, no substantive challenges to the
Guidelines have survived the motion to dismiss stage. 205
The absence of judicial review has severe ramifications, particularly
for the approximately eighty million beneficiaries of federally
subsidized food programs. 206 The nutrition standards for the National
200. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 Fed. Reg. 33742,
33791 (2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
201. See, e.g., Heid, supra note 13 (“‘It’s upsetting to see cycles of misinformation coming back
over and over again,’ says Dr. David Heber, founding director of the University of California, Los
Angeles, Center for Human Nutrition. ‘The public has been confused and will remain confused by
these guidelines.’”).
202. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 79 Fed. Reg. 11880,
11881–82 (Mar. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
203. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2011).
204. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016).
205. See, e.g., Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Glickman, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2000).
206. Secemsky, supra note 9.
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School Lunch Program can be challenged under the APA because they
are clearly declared agency rules by the language of their authorizing
statute. 207 However, the statute only requires that the standards be
consistent with the Guidelines; it does not give potential plaintiffs a
right to “healthy” or “nutritionally adequate” meals. 208 It does not
provide any other standard against which prospective plaintiffs could
claim the standards violate the APA as “arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 209 Thus, because the Guidelines
are insulated from review, the school lunch nutrition standards cannot
be meaningfully challenged for nutritional inadequacy, only
consistency with the Guidelines. 210
Another barrier to judicial review is standing. 211 Most challenges to
the Guidelines have been brought by public interest groups largely
unable to establish a particularized injury. 212 Some courts have analyzed
such claims, appearing to accept the standing of these organizations—
but these outcomes cannot be extrapolated far given that such cases
were dismissed on other grounds or did not seek appreciable reform. 213
Because the Guidelines are insulated from judicial review, their
many other flaws—rampant conflicts of interest and paucities of public
participation and transparency—remain unchecked.
F. Disproportionate Impact
These failures of process and the questionable nutrition standards
that result have a disproportionate impact on low-income communities
and communities of color. These communities are more directly
impacted because they comprise most of the beneficiaries of federally
subsidized food assistance programs and can rely on these programs

207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1758.
208. Id. § 1758(f).
209. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
210. See generally Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. Perdue, 438 F. Supp. 3d 546 (D. Md. 2020)
(challenging a Final Rule governing school nutrition standards for inconsistency with the Dietary
Guidelines and for failure to adhere to proper rulemaking procedures).
211. Under the standing doctrine, a plaintiff may sue in federal court only if they can allege a
“concrete and particularized injury that is: 1) actual or imminent, 2) caused by, or fairly traceable
to, an act that [plaintiff] challenges in the instant litigation, and 3) redressable by the court.”
Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
212. E.g., id. at 29.
213. See, e.g., Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Glickman, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3
(D.D.C. 2000) (granting Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief under FACA); Physicians Comm.
for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016)
(turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim without discussing standing).
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for significant portions of their total daily intake. 214 Although an
important tool for addressing food insecurity, these programs often
dictate beneficiaries’ food choices, 215 taking away their freedom to
interpret the nutrition science for themselves. And while lacking such
freedom, these communities become those harmed most by the
narrative that nutrition is a matter of personal choice. 216 Moreover,
poor nutrition causes and compounds chronic disease, exacerbating
existing health disparities which stem from systemic oppression. 217
III. APPLYING THE APA TO THE DIETARY GUIDELINES
This Note contends that the most effective solution to the concerns
outlined above is for the Guidelines to be an agency rule subject to the
APA. Rules are subject to procedural requirements and judicial review
that can alleviate—though not eliminate—many of the issues discussed
in Part II. This change can be accomplished through an amendment to
the Nutrition Act or through litigation that challenges the D.C. District
Court’s holding in Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) v.
Vilsack that the Guidelines are not an agency rule.
A. Advantages of Applying the APA
The APA would provide much-needed accountability to the
Guidelines and the process for their development. The APA’s
rulemaking procedures ensure that agencies engage in reasoned
decision-making that is transparent and considers input from a variety

214. See, e.g., CONSTANCE NEWMAN & KATHERINE RALSTON, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROFILES OF
PARTICIPANTS IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: DATA FROM TWO NATIONAL SURVEYS iii, 10–
11, 13–14, 16 tbls.5–8 (2006), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44110/48589
_eib17.pdf?v=0 [https://perma.cc/PB45-QXWX] (showing that National School Lunch Program
participants are disproportionately low income and that the Program’s free lunch recipients are
predominantly non-white, as compared to the overall student population); Mary Story, Guest
Editorial, The Third School Nutrition Dietary Assessment Study: Findings and Policy Implications for
Improving the Health of US Children, 109 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N (SUPP.) S7, S8 (2009).
215. See, e.g., WIC Food Packages – Maximum Monthly Allowances, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Mar. 25,
2021), https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/wic-food-packages-maximum-monthly-allowances [https://
perma.cc/HUL6-89XU].
216. See Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal Government’s Failing
Public Health Campaign, 112 PA. STATE L. REV. 529, 531, 562–64 (2007).
217. E.g., Jessie A. Satia, Diet-Related Disparities: Understanding the Problem and Accelerating
Solutions, 109 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 610 (2009); Maria Chiorando, NBA Champ John Salley Urges U.S.
Government to Ditch Racist Dietary Guidelines, PLANT BASED NEWS (Aug. 12, 2020), https://
plantbasednews.org/lifestyle/john-salley-urges-government-ditch-racist-dietary-guidelines/
[https://perma.cc/NF7R-TV55] (“Dairy products are unnecessary and take a disproportionate
health toll on people of color.”).
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of sources. 218 The APA additionally provides several grounds for
challenging inappropriate agency action in the courts. 219
Rules must follow the APA’s rulemaking procedures, which often
mandate the notice-and-comment process. 220 This process requires
agencies to provide public notice of proposed rules and to allow
sufficient time for public comment. 221 These requirements allow the
public to have input on rulemaking and help agencies acquire relevant
information. The procedural requirements also provide grounds for
legal challenges against agency actions that fail to follow the proper
procedures. 222 Currently, USDA and HHS voluntarily take public
comment on the Committee report but not on the Guidelines
themselves. 223
The APA provides some exceptions to the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process. For example, the requirements do not apply to
“non-legislative rules,” which are “interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice.” 224 “Legislative rules,” on the other hand, are promulgated
through the notice-and-comment process and have the force and effect
of law. 225 Legislative rules can be exempt from notice-and-comment if
the agency has “good cause” to dispense with the procedures.226
Distinguishing legislative from non-legislative rules requires
determining whether an action simply interprets existing law or results
in a substantive change to existing law. 227 Under the APA, an injured
party may challenge an agency action that did not follow notice-andcomment procedures on the ground that the action was a legislative
rule and thus is invalid for failing to comply with procedural
requirements. 228 If the Guidelines are deemed a legislative rule, they
must undergo notice-and-comment and can be challenged for failure to
do so. While non-legislative rules are exempt from the notice-andcomment process, they are still susceptible to judicial scrutiny under
the APA.
The statute provides several grounds upon which a court may hold
an agency action invalid. These include the procedural grounds

218.

See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING

AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2, 15 (2017).

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

5 U.S.C. § 706.
GARVEY, supra note 218, at 1–9.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
§ 706(2)(D).
See Public Comments to USDA and HHS, supra note 183.
GARVEY, supra note 218, at 1 n.5; § 553(b)(3)(A).
GARVEY, supra note 218, at 1 n.5.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
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discussed earlier in this Subsection, like failure to observe notice-andcomment. 229 An injured party can also claim that an action is outside
the scope of the agency’s statutory authority; that it violates the U.S.
Constitution; or, that it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 230 These grounds can enable
meaningful challenges to the Guidelines’ content.
Under the “arbitrary and capricious standard,” a court may set an
agency action aside: if the agency’s findings of fact are unsupported by
substantial evidence; if the agency’s policy decisions are not based on
relevant factors; if the agency failed to compile a record sufficient for
the court to determine whether these grounds are met; or, if the action
reflects a clear error in judgment or is otherwise arbitrary and
capricious. 231 An agency’s factual determinations must “examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’” 232 Under the APA, courts could scrutinize the Guidelines’ factual
findings, including that cholesterol is no longer a nutrient of concern. 233
Courts still show a lot of deference to agencies, particularly where a
decision relies on complex, often competing, scientific or technical
information. 234 But the mere possibility of judicial review would compel
USDA and HHS to justify their factfinding. In particular, they would
have to explain any deviations between the Guidelines and the
Committee report, 235 and reason-giving alone can improve the quality
of decisions. 236 An agency action subject to notice-and-comment will
also be considered arbitrary and capricious if an agency fails to respond
to significant comments. 237 The availability of judicial review renders
the public comment process meaningful by giving the public some
bargaining power, namely, the threat of litigation that could overturn
the agencies’ actions. If the Guidelines had been an agency action in
2015, HHS and USDA would have had to address some of the 18,000

229. § 706(2).
230. Id.
231. Id.; GARVEY, supra note 218, at 13.
232. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
233. See 2015 SCIENTIFIC REPORT, supra note 90, at 58.
234. E.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 2013 (1983).
235. As discussed above, this was one of the National Academies’ recommendations for
improving the Guidelines process. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. USDA and HHS
eventually agreed to implement the recommendation, but notable deviations are unlikely to
reoccur given the agencies’ tightened grip on the entire process. Id.
236. See generally Lawrence Solum, The Obligation to Give Reasons, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (July 23,
2006), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/07/the_obligation_.html [https://perma.cc
/S7RS-S8J6] (explaining the benefits of judicial reason-giving); Ashley S. Deeks, Secret ReasonGiving, 129 YALE L.J. 612, 620.
237. See United States v. N.S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977).
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comments supporting the Guidelines’ consideration of sustainability,
or risk litigation that may invalidate their decision. 238
An agency action is also arbitrary and capricious if the decision did
not consider all the relevant factors or considered irrelevant factors.239
Which factors are relevant is generally determined by reference to the
statute authorizing the agency action in question. 240 The Nutrition Act
mandates that the Guidelines contain “nutritional and dietary
information and guidelines for the general public” and “shall be based
on the preponderance of the scientific and medical knowledge.” 241 APA
challenges to the Guidelines could reduce the impermissible influence
by the irrelevant factor of USDA’s duty to promote domestic
agricultural products, 242 as this consideration is not directly relevant to
nutrition science. Courts may also invalidate an action where the
agencies failed to “exercise sufficiently independent judgment” by
deferring to private parties. 243 On this ground, the Guidelines could be
challenged for being inappropriately influenced by the food and
beverage industries.
In sum, the APA would provide the public with many procedural
and substantive safeguards. Notice-and-comment requirements would
ensure that the Guidelines themselves would be promulgated with
public input. This would sharply contrast the current scheme of
voluntary public comment on the Committee report, from which the
Guidelines may deviate substantially. The threat of judicial review
would compel USDA and HHS to explain their reasoning for any such
deviations, as well as justify their factual findings and policy decisions.
These agencies would also have to respond to significant comments and
compile a record of their decision-making. While the APA would not
directly address conflicts of interest among the Committee members or
within the agencies, it would limit the influence of these conflicts on the
final Guidelines. 244
Much of the legal scholarship on the Guidelines has focused on
reforms to the Committee, paying particular attention to the

238. See Mary K. Caffrey, Food Politics Get Heated as Dietary Guidelines Near Approval, AM. J.
MANAGED CARE (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.ajmc.com/view/food-politics-get-heated-as-dietaryguidelines-near-approval [https://perma.cc/DRV2-5JT2].
239. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v.
Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 668 (1985).
240. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
241. 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1)–(2).
242. See § 1622; see generally Sunstein, supra note 239, at 668.
243. Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. v. F.C.C., 265 F.3d 313, 327–29 (5th Cir. 2001).
244. Cf. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (invalidating FDA’s
restrictions on Plan B because impermissible political intrusion made decision arbitrary and
capricious under the APA).

508

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

Committee’s composition. 245 But the 2015 and 2020 Guidelines
processes have shown how USDA and HHS can overrule the
Committee’s recommendations. Judicial review would allow challenges
to the substance of the Guidelines, regardless of which body issues
them. 246 Both judicial review and notice-and-comment procedures
would improve transparency, making it more difficult for the
Guidelines to employ misleading language to hide shaky factual
underpinnings. A more rigorous Guidelines development process
would also reduce concerns about FDA regulations relying on them and
could create more consistency and thus greater confidence in the
Guidelines.
Perhaps the most important advantage of a single, robust set of
Guidelines is that they could serve as the foundation for more sound
nutrition policy overall. Federal nutrition policy currently focuses on
information regulation, but scholars have called for the government to
take a more active role in combating the public health crisis of pervasive
diet-related disease and premature death. 247 Healthy foods could be
more accessibly priced if they were subsidized by the federal
government, for example, by aligning Farm Bill subsidies with
authoritative dietary guidance. 248 Concrete nutrition goals could also
support calls for a higher minimum wage and other labor reforms that
would give people the necessary “leisure” time to make healthy choices.
Although detailed discussion of these reforms is beyond the scope of
this Note, few of these strategies are viable without sound nutrition
guidance as a foundation.
B. The Dietary Guidelines Already Resemble a Rule
Principles of administrative law, as well as policy benefits, favor the
Guidelines being a rule. From a functional perspective, the Guidelines

245. See, e.g., Gabriela Steier, Dead People Don’t Eat: Food Governmentenomics and Conflicts-ofInterest in the USDA and FDA, 7 PITT. J. ENV’T PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 2 (2012) (proposing statutory
amendments to rebalance the composition of the advisory committees and the scientific basis for
the dietary recommendations); Herman, supra note 174, at 305–08 (proposing statutory
amendments to redesignate the Guidelines to a health agency and to prohibit conflicted
individuals from serving on the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee).
246. It is crucial to create accountability with respect to the substance of the Guidelines in this
age of industry-funded research, where unconflicted parties are fewer and farther between, and
where conflicts may be the cost of higher-quality experts.
247. See, e.g., Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 6, at 1237–40 (arguing that FDA should use its
discretion to increase spending on nutrition, currently only two percent of its budget). In fact, the
Guidelines have been criticized for the harmful effects of telling people that they should eat better
without modifying their environment to make it easier for them to make healthy choices. Garcia,
supra note 216, at 564–65.
248. See generally Mortazavi, supra note 174.
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satisfy the criteria that courts use to determine whether an agency
statement is a rule and thus an agency action. Moreover, the
circumstances suggest that the Guidelines are not just a rule but a
legislative rule subject to the notice-and-comment requirements from
which non-legislative rules are exempt.
The APA defines “agency action” fairly broadly, but courts will deny
review if the agency’s challenged conduct does not meet the statutory
definition, i.e., if it is not a “rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 249 When determining
whether an agency statement is a reviewable agency action, courts look
to the “actual interpretation and effect” of the statement. 250 Some
courts also consider whether the agency statement was disseminated
pursuant to a statutory authorization. 251 Generally, an agency statement
that establishes legal rights or obligations is reviewable. 252 Accordingly,
courts have denied requests for review of agency publications and press
releases. 253 For example, Industrial Safety Equipment Association v. EPA
involved a challenge to a report published jointly by EPA and the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health titled, “A Guide
to Respiratory Protection for the Asbestos Abatement Industry.” 254 The
report listed all of the available asbestos respirators that may be used
under existing regulations, but encouraged use of only two types of
respirators. 255 The plaintiffs, a trade association and respirator
manufacturers, alleged that the report effectively revoked certification
of some of their respirators, which were not singled out for use in the
report. 256 The court held that the report was not an agency action
because it did not change the standards necessary to obtain
certification, nor did it restrict or revoke existing certification. 257 The
report was also consistent with existing regulations and thus did not
constitute a new agency interpretation of those regulations. 258 The
court concluded that, “where an agency disseminates information in
the absence of a specific statutory authorization, and the publication
does not bind the agency or alter the rights, liabilities, obligations, or
legal relationships of private parties, then no reviewable ‘agency action’
249. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
250. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. E.P.A., 656 F. Supp. 852, 855 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d, 837 F.2d
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
251. E.g., Hearst Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.D.C. 1948) (holding FCC’s report,
which exposed plaintiff’s radio station to public controversy, was not a “sanction” and thus not an
agency action).
252. GARVEY, supra note 218, at 6–7.
253. See id. at 7–8.
254. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n, 656 F. Supp. at 853.
255. Id. at 854.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 855–56.
258. Id.
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has occurred.” 259 Like the asbestos report, the Guidelines contain
guidance and best practices related to a regulatory framework. But
unlike the asbestos report, the Guidelines are issued pursuant to a
statutory mandate; and, more importantly, they affect legal rights and
obligations. Since 1994, USDA has been required to issue school meal
nutrition standards that conform with the Guidelines. 260 States that
receive federal funding for school meals and other federally subsidized
programs must meet these standards. 261 The Guidelines create legal
duties governing USDA rulemaking and state policy-setting, and they
give program beneficiaries a legal right to Guidelines-compliant
meals. 262
Given their legal consequences, the Guidelines should be
considered an agency action subject to judicial review. Moreover, the
Guidelines should be considered a legislative rule subject to notice-andcomment procedures and the additional opportunities for judicial
review that such procedures provide. Legislative rules are rules that do
not meet the definition of “non-legislative rules,” which include agency
procedural rules, interpretative rules, and general statements of
policy. 263 The Guidelines do not fit any of these exceptions.
Agency procedural rules are the “technical regulation of the form of
agency action and proceedings” and they must have an intra-agency
impact. 264 The definition excludes any action “which is likely to have
considerable impact on ultimate agency decisions” or that “substantially
affects the rights of those over whom the agency exercises authority.” 265
The Guidelines are far too impactful to qualify as a procedural rule. As
in the case of the school meal nutrition standards, they govern the
substance rather than the form of agency decisions. The Guidelines are
thus likely to have a considerable impact on those decisions and on the
people whose rights are affected by those decisions.
Interpretative rules announce an agency’s interpretation of a
statute in a way that “only reminds affected parties of existing duties”

259. Id.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1758.
261. Id.
262. Admittedly, the Guidelines’ bindingness has been somewhat diminished by CSPI v.
Perdue, which upheld USDA’s interpretation of its obligation as requiring only that the school
nutrition standards loosely conform to the overarching goals of the Guidelines. See Ctr. for Sci. in
the Pub. Interest v. Perdue, 438 F. Supp. 3d 546 (D. Md. 2020). This holding is likely a correct
application of the Chevron doctrine, but that also means that another administration may interpret
its obligation more stringently.
263. GARVEY, supra note 218, at 7.
264. Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
265. Id. at 1113–14.
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but do not effect a substantive change in the regulations. 266 Each edition
of the Guidelines alters the substantive requirements to which other
programs must conform. 267 They do not purport to interpret statutory
language.
General statements of policy are “statements issued by an agency to
advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” 268 Agency guidance
documents are a common example of these statements, and their rising
use and widespread impact have sparked debate over whether they
should in fact be exempt from notice-and-comment. 269 But even under
the current framework, the Guidelines do not fit this exemption. Unlike
general statements of policy, the Guidelines do not announce an
agency’s “tentative intentions for the future in a non-binding
manner.” 270 The Guidelines establish binding consequences from the
moment they are published. Thus, the Guidelines do not fall into any of
the categories of non-legislative rules.
To summarize, the practical effects of the Guidelines suggest that
the Guidelines are an agency rule subject to notice-and-comment and
judicial review under the APA. When Congress enacted the Nutrition
Act in 1990, it may not have intended for the Guidelines to constitute a
rule because at the time, the Guidelines contained non-binding advice.
But since 1994, the Guidelines have had binding consequences on
agency decision making and on the beneficiaries of those decisions.
Accordingly, the Guidelines have become a legislative rule and should
be treated as such.
C. Strategy 1: Litigation
Courts are empowered to review agency activities and determine
whether they were conducted in accordance with the APA. An aggrieved
party could challenge the Guidelines, alleging that they should have
undergone notice-and-comment or that their contents do not reflect
reasoned agency decision-making. A court could hold that the
Guidelines fall within the scope of the APA, subjecting them to all of the
procedural and substantive constraints discussed in Section III.A.
266. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Citizens to
Save Spencer Cnty. v. E.P.A., 600 F.2d 844, 876 & n.153 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (internal quotations
omitted).
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 1758.
268. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (photo. reprt. 1973) (1947).
269. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informed Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 400–02 (2007).
270. GARVEY, supra note 218, at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
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The only court that directly faced the question of whether the
Guidelines constitute reviewable agency action answered in the
negative. 271 In PCRM v. Vilsack, as explained below, the D.C. District
Court’s holding relies on a flawed interpretation of the Nutrition Act
and an erroneous account of the Guidelines’ effects. Because only one
district court case has adopted this flawed interpretation, another court
could easily find otherwise, or the D.C. District could diverge from its
own prior ruling. In doing so, a court could bring the Guidelines within
the scope of the APA, achieving beneficial policy outcomes and
adhering more faithfully to principles of administrative law.
In Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Vilsack, the plaintiff
argued that the Dietary Guidelines were an agency procedural rule. 272
The court rejected this argument and dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim, reasoning: 273
The Dietary Guidelines, however, is not an agency statement
describing the USDA or HHS organizations or the agencies’
procedures or practice requirements. It is, in sum, a report
containing “nutritional and dietary information and guidelines
for the general public.” 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(1). As the Nutrition Act
makes clear, such dietary guidance “does not include any rule or
regulation issued by a Federal agency,” and thus, does not
constitute an “agency action.” Id. § 5341(b)(3). 274
The court seems to have erred by interpreting § 5341(b)(3) as defining
the Guidelines themselves, which are established in subsection (a).275
This provision states that “the term ‘dietary guidance for the general
population’ does not include any rule or regulation issued by a Federal
agency.” 276 But that provision is, by its own terms, limited to “for
purposes of this subsection.” 277 Subsection (b), entitled “Approval by
Secretaries,” describes the process by which “dietary guidance for the
general population” proposed by a federal agency must be submitted to
the USDA and HHS Secretaries for approval. 278 Section 5341(b)(3)
creates an exception to subsection (b)’s approval requirement by

271.
2011).
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29–30 (D.D.C.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 5341.
§ 5341(b)(3).
Id.
Id. § 5341(b).
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providing that “‘dietary guidance for the general population’ does not
include any rule or regulation issued by a Federal agency.” 279
Thus, the provision relied on by the D.C. District Court simply
reflects Congress’s intent that agency rules and regulations be exempt
from this approval process because their inclusion would be inefficient
and redundant. If the Secretaries do not approve of guidance submitted
to them, then such guidance must go through the notice-and-comment
process prior to publication. 280 This process ensures that any dietary
guidance either conforms to the Guidelines or goes through noticeand-comment. Agency rules and regulations already undergo noticeand-comment, so this approval process would not add much benefit. In
light of this natural interpretation of the Nutrition Act, it seems that the
court erroneously applied the exemption provision of subsection (b) to
define the Guidelines themselves, established in subsection (a), rather
than solely to define the dietary guidance requiring review under
subsection (b). 281
But the court’s reasoning was vague. It did not clearly explain how
it concluded that the Dietary Guidelines are “dietary guidance for the
general population” under § 5341(b)(3). 282 Defendant’s motion to dismiss
brief provides more specific reasoning in its arguments, which likely
formed the basis of the court’s opinion. Defendants argued that “the
Dietary Guidelines in no way describe the USDA’s or HHS’s
organizations, or the agencies’ procedures or practice requirements.
Rather, they are a report that contains nutritional and dietary
information and guidelines for the general public.” 283 Defendants
further argued that because federal guidance that promote the
Guidelines are not rules or regulations (according to § 5341(b)(3)), the
Guidelines themselves cannot be a rule or regulation. 284 If the court’s
holding was based on Defendants’ arguments, then perhaps it did not
mistakenly apply a provision to the wrong subsection. Rather, the court
interpreted subsection (b) to necessarily mean that the Guidelines are
not a rule or regulation.
But even so, Defendants’ argument is circular. They proposed that
because guidance based on the Guidelines does not constitute rules or
regulations, the Guidelines themselves cannot be a rule or regulation.
Defendants provided no explanation for why this must be the case. To
the contrary, the very fact that the Guidelines dictate how agencies may
279. Id. § 5341(b)(3).
280. Id. § 5341(b)(2)
281. See id. § 5341.
282. See Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2011).
283. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss at 15, Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Vilsack, 867 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
2011) (No. 11-0038), 2011 WL 12851056.
284. Id. at 15–16.
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issue guidance suggests that they should be considered a rule.
Moreover, Defendants’ arguments ignored the agency rules and
regulations that not only promote but incorporate and make binding
the Guidelines. For example, USDA nutrition standards governing the
School Lunch Program must comply with the Guidelines and are
promulgated through notice-and-comment. 285 These regulations were
simply excluded from Defendants’ narrow analysis because they do not
relate to the provision relied upon. The case was dismissed on several
other grounds, however, including for lack of standing, so perhaps the
court employed faulty reasoning merely because it did not spend much
time on this analysis as it would not have changed the outcome. 286
In sum, courts could, and should, split from PCRM v. Vilsack and
hold that the Guidelines are an agency action. As described in Section
III.B, properly applying the conventional methods for analyzing agency
action leads to the conclusion that the Guidelines are a legislative rule.
And, as explained earlier in this subsection, the statutory language of
the Nutrition Act poses no bar to this conclusion.
Alternatively, a court could hold that the Guidelines are a nonlegislative rule. In PCRM v. Vilsack, PCRM argued that the Guidelines
are an agency procedural rule rather than arguing that they are a
legislative rule. 287 PCRM probably did so to appeal to judicial modesty;
determining that the Guidelines constitute a legislative rule would have
far more ramifications than classifying them as a non-legislative rule.
Although, as discussed in Section III.B, the Guidelines do not fit the
definition of an agency procedural rule, courts might still classify them
as such because of their unique characteristics. The Guidelines are
unlike any other agency conduct. In form, they resemble an
informational publication, which would not be considered agency
action. But few agency publications have such widespread effects, let
alone binding consequences, which typify legislative rules. 288 Because
the Guidelines are unique and because the agency action doctrines are
constantly evolving, courts could categorize the Guidelines as an agency
procedural rule. While this would not secure some of the benefits of
285. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(a)(4).
286. There may be valid arguments that the Guidelines are not an agency action, but these
arguments were not discussed by the courts. For example, there’s an intentionalist and historical
argument. USDA and HHS did not intend for the Guidelines to be a rule or regulation when the
agencies voluntarily began publishing this purely informational report in 1980. And if Congress
had intended for the Guidelines to be a rule when it enacted the Nutrition Act in 1990, it could have
made that intent clear given the Guidelines’ history of promulgation without regard to the APA.
This Note does not dispute this point but instead emphasizes that the Guidelines effectively
became a rule when other statutes made them binding.
287. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 9–10,
Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med., 867 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-0038), 2011 WL
12851056.
288. GARVEY, supra note 218, at 7.
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notice-and-comment, such as the requirement that agencies respond to
significant comments, classification as a non-legislative rule has some
advantages as well. Notice-and-comment procedures are
extraordinarily time-intensive, so bypassing them could ensure that the
Guidelines are published on time every five years. Congress requires
EPA to revise the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
every five years, but they have only been updated four times since they
were established in 1971. 289 Thus, both possibilities have benefits and
drawbacks, and courts could choose either route.
D. Strategy 2: Legislation
A straightforward—if politically unlikely—avenue for bringing the
Guidelines within the scope of the APA would be for Congress to amend
the Nutrition Act to explicitly provide that the Guidelines are a rule. The
Nutrition Act is currently silent on how the Guidelines should be
characterized. As discussed above, Congress in 1990 likely did not
intend for the Guidelines to go through notice-and-comment. But that
Congress also did not intend for the Guidelines to have the widespread
impact they have today. Since 1990, the Guidelines have grown
significantly in impact and acceptance. More importantly, the
Guidelines directly define the legal rights and obligations of agencies,
states, and the public.
In amending the Nutrition Act, Congress has significantly more
flexibility than the courts. Congress could provide that the Guidelines
are a legislative rule and subject them to notice-and-comment, or
exempt them but still allow for judicial review. Congress could also
devise special procedures for the Guidelines, given their unique
character, such as requiring that the agencies respond to public
comment and providing a private right of action for failure to comply
with these procedures. This would not invite substantive challenges,
but would still compel the agencies to explain their reasoning, and
would make public participation meaningful. Congress could also
amend the substantive statutory mandate to be more specific about the
Guidelines’ objectives and scientific basis, as other scholars have
proposed. 290 Finally, as numerous scholars, commentators, and
practitioners have urged, Congress could eliminate USDA’s role in

289. EPA, EPA-452/R-20-002, POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, 1-4, 1-6 (2020), https://www.epa.gov/system/files
/documents/2021-10/final-policy-assessment-for-the-review-of-the-pm-naaqs-01-2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8H8G-WYJU].
290. See Garcia, supra note 216, at 564–65; Steier, supra note 245, at 2, 7.
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setting nutrition policy and thereby commit that function to an
unconflicted agency dedicated to health. 291
CONCLUSION
The Dietary Guidelines for Americans are scientifically unsound
because of defects in their promulgation process. These defects allowed
the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee to become unduly
influenced by industry interests. The Committee’s few scientifically
sound recomedations can be cast aside by USDA and HHS officials
without a word of explanation. When these defects are challenged,
courts hold that the Guidelines are unreviewable under the applicable
statutes.
But those courts decided incorrectly. The Guidelines do in fact fall
within the coverage of the APA, which would be effective in remedying
the Guidelines’ shortcomings. The APA would require agency officials
to explain their decision-making, to support their findings with
sufficient evidence, to consider the relevant factors (and not consider
irrelevant factors), and to make no arbitrary and capricious decisions.
This would help to ensure that the Committee considers all the relevant
nutritional science and to protect the promulgation process from
political influence. As a result, health outcomes would improve, and
Americans would live healthier, happier lives.

291.

See, e.g., Torrez, supra note 174; Mortazavi, supra note 174; Herman, supra note 174.

